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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we must determine the appropriate legal 
standard to apply when evaluating an employer's business 
justification in an action challenging an employer's cutoff 
score on an employment screening exam as discriminatory 
under a disparate impact theory of liability. We hold today 
that under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a discriminatory 
 
cutoff score on an entry level employment examination 
must be shown to measure the minimum qualifications 
necessary for successful performance of the job in question 
in order to survive a disparate impact challenge. Because 
we find that the District Court did not apply this standard 
in evaluating the employer's business justification for its 
discriminatory cutoff score in this case, we will reverse the 
District Court's judgment and remand for reconsideration 
under this standard. In light of our decision to remand on 





This appeal comes to us from a judgment entered by the 
District Court in favor of the Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") after a twelve day bench 
trial in January of 1998. Although the parties generally do 
not dispute the facts relevant to this appeal, to the extent 
there are favorable inferences to be drawn, we must draw 
them in favor of SEPTA as the prevailing party. In addition, 
 
because we must not disturb the factual findings of the 
District Court unless clearly erroneous, much of the 
following background is adopted from the facts as found by 
the District Court in its extensive memorandum opinion. 
See Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 
1998 WL 341605, at *1-*52 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1998). 
 




SEPTA is a regional mass transit authority that operates 
principally in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1989, in 
response to a perceived need to upgrade the quality of its 
transit police force, SEPTA initiated an extensive program 
designed to improve the department. As part of this 
program, SEPTA dedicated its transit officers primarily to 
patrolling the subways and limited their responsibilities to 
serve as guards at other SEPTA property. In addition, 
SEPTA increased the number of its officers from 96 to 200 
and introduced a "zone concept" for the areas they patrol.1 
SEPTA also began to consider methods by which it might 
upgrade the physical fitness level of its police officers. 
 
In 1991, SEPTA hired Dr. Paul Davis to develop an 
appropriate physical fitness test for its police officers.2 Dr. 
Davis initially met with SEPTA officials in order to ascertain 
SEPTA's objectives. Dr. Davis determined that SEPTA was 
interested in enhancing the level of fitness, physical vigor 
and general productivity of its police force. Once Dr. Davis 
had determined SEPTA's objectives, he went on a ride-along 
with SEPTA transit police and, over the course of two days 
and approximately twenty hours, rode the SEPTA trains in 
order to obtain a perspective on the expectations of SEPTA 
transit officers. 
 
Dr. Davis next conducted a study with twenty 
experienced SEPTA officers, designated "subject matter 
experts" (SMEs), in an effort to determine what physical 
abilities are required to perform the job of SEPTA transit 
officer. From the responses Dr. Davis received in this study, 
he determined that running, jogging, and walking were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under the zone concept, SEPTA designated eight separate zones 
covering the subway system. In a typical zone, one Lieutenant is 
assigned to command the zone. Two Sergeants are also assigned to the 
zone. Three shifts of officers per day tour the zone. Beats within the 
zones are assigned to the individual officers. Beats are reassigned 
periodically to familiarize the officers with the entire zone. Officers 
patrol 
their beats alone and on foot. 
 
2. Dr. Davis is an expert exercise physiologist who has extensive 
experience in designing physical fitness employment tests for various law 
enforcement agencies. 
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important SEPTA transit officer tasks and that SEPTA 
officers were expected to jog almost on a daily basis. 
 
Dr. Davis then asked the SMEs to determine what level 
of physical exertion was necessary to perform these tasks. 
The SMEs estimated that it was reasonable to expect them 
to run one mile in full gear in 11.78 minutes. Dr. Davis 
rejected this estimate as too low based upon his 
determination that any individual could meet this 
requirement. Ultimately, Dr. Davis recommended a 1.5 mile 
run within 12 minutes. Dr. Davis explained that completion 
of this run would require that an officer possess an aerobic 
capacity of 42.5 mL/kg/min, the aerobic capacity that Dr. 
Davis determined would be necessary to perform the job of 
SEPTA transit officer.3 
 
Dr. Davis recommended that SEPTA use the 1.5 mile run 
as an applicant screening test. Dr. Davis understood that 
SEPTA officers would not be required to run 1.5 miles 
within 12 minutes in the course of their duties, but he 
nevertheless recommended this test as an accurate 
measure of the aerobic capacity necessary to perform the 
job of SEPTA transit police officer. Based upon Dr. Davis' 
recommendation, SEPTA adopted a physical fitness 
screening test for its applicants which included a 1.5 mile 
run within 12 minutes. Beginning in 1991, the 1.5 mile run 
was administered as the first component of the physical 
fitness test; if an applicant failed to run 1.5 miles in 12 
minutes, the applicant would be disqualified from 
employment as a SEPTA transit officer. 
 
It is undisputed that for the years 1991, 1993, and 1996, 
an average of only 12% of women applicants passed 
SEPTA's 1.5 mile run in comparison to the almost 60% of 
male applicants who passed.4 For the years 1993 and 1996, 
the time period in question in this litigation, the pass rate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Dr. Davis initially decided that an aerobic capacity of 50 mL/kg/min 
was necessary to perform the job of SEPTA transit police officer. After 
determining that institution of such a high standard would have a 
draconian effect on women applicants, however, Dr. Davis decided that 
the goals of SEPTA could be satisfied by using a 42.5 mL/kg/min 
standard. 
4. SEPTA contends that it did not seek applicants in 1992. Credited 
testimony was offered, however, that each of the six or seven women who 
took the 1.5 mile test in 1992 failed. Relying on this testimony, the 
District Court found that the disparate impact on women was slightly 
more pronounced than the 1991, 1993, and 1996 figures reflect. See 
Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at *28. 
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for women was 6.7% compared to a 55.6% pass rate for 
men. In addition, research studies confirm that a cutoff of 
12 minutes on a 1.5 mile run will have a disparately 
adverse impact on women.5 SEPTA concedes that its 1.5 
mile run has a disparate impact on women. 
 
In conjunction with the implementation of its physical 
fitness screening test, SEPTA also began testing incumbent 
officers for aerobic capacity in 1991. SEPTA policy requires 
any officer who fails any portion of the incumbentfitness 
test to retest on the failed element within three months. For 
each portion of the physical fitness test that an incumbent 
officer fails, an interim goal is set for that officer. 
 
SEPTA initially disciplined those incumbent officers who 
failed the fitness test. Due to protests by the incumbent 
officers' union, however, SEPTA discontinued its discipline 
policy and instead implemented an incentive program that 
rewarded incumbent officers for passing their interim 
fitness goals. 
 
According to SEPTA's internal documents, significant 
percentages of incumbent officers of all ranks have failed 
SEPTA's physical fitness test.6 By 1996, however, 86% of 
incumbent officers reached SEPTA's physical fitness 
standards. SEPTA has never taken any steps to determine 
whether incumbent officers who have failed the physical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. For example, one proffered study showed that approximately 47% of 
men between the ages of 20 to 29 can perform a 1.5 mile run in 12 
minutes where only 12% of women in the same age category can achieve 
this time. As noted by the District Court, testimony was offered that this 
study may not be entirely reliable because the women who participated 
in the study were predominately white women of higher socioeconomic 
status. Other research studies, however, were offered which show that 
men generally have a higher aerobic rate than women due to 
physiological differences between the sexes. 
 
6. The District Court pointed to one document, for example, indicating 
that between July 1, 1994 and August 22, 1995, the percentage of 
uniformed personnel who failed the fitness test was as follows: a) Age 
group 20-30: 10% of all officers; b) Age group 30-40: 30% of all officers 
and 12% of all supervisors; c) Age group 40-50: 45% of all officers and 
52% of all supervisors; d) Age group 50-60: 55% of all officers and 40% 
of all supervisors. See Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at *31. 
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fitness test have adversely affected SEPTA's ability to carry 
out its mission. 
 
SEPTA has promoted incumbent officers who have failed 
some or all of the components of the physical fitness test. 
SEPTA has also given special recognition, commendations, 
and satisfactory performance evaluations to incumbent 
officers who have failed the physical fitness test. SEPTA has 
never disciplined, terminated, removed, reassigned, 
suspended or demoted any transit officer for failing to 
perform the physical requirements of the job. 
 
In addition, due to a clerical error, SEPTA hired a female 
officer in 1991 who failed the 1.5 mile run. This officer has 
subsequently been "decorated" by SEPTA and has been 
nominated repeatedly for awards such as Officer of the Year 
and Officer of the Quarter. SEPTA has commended her for 
her outstanding performance as a police officer and has 
chosen her to serve as one of SEPTA's two defensive tactics 
instructors. 
 
SEPTA employs an extremely low number of women in its 
transit police force. The District Court found that, as of 
July 1997, SEPTA employed only 16 women in its 234 
member police force. Only two of these women hold ranks 
higher than that of patrol officer. See Lanning, 1998 WL 




On January 28, 1997, after satisfying all administrative 
prerequisites, five women who failed SEPTA's 1.5 mile run 
brought a Title VII class action against SEPTA on behalf of 
all 1993 female applicants, 1996 female applicants and 
future female applicants for employment as SEPTA police 
officers who have been or will be denied employment by 
reason of their inability to meet the physical entrance 
requirement of running 1.5 miles in 12 minutes or less. On 
February 18, 1997, the Department of Justice, after 
conducting the appropriate investigation of SEPTA's 
employment practices and meeting all conditions precedent 
under Title VII, also filed suit on behalf of the United States 
challenging SEPTA's entire physical fitness test, including 
the 1.5 mile run. The District Court properly exercised 
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jurisdiction over these Title VII actions challenging SEPTA's 
hiring practices pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. On April 21, 
1997, the District Court consolidated the two actions for all 
purposes up to and including trial. 
 
After litigation commenced, SEPTA hired expert 
statisticians to submit reports examining the statistical 
relationship between the aerobic capacity of SEPTA's 
officers and their number of arrests, "arrest rates"7 and 
number of commendations. In these reports, the 
statisticians concluded that there was a statistically 
significant correlation between high aerobic capacity and 
arrests, arrest rates and commendations. In addition, one 
expert prepared a report that estimated that 51.9% of the 
persons arrested for serious crimes between 1991 and 1996 
had an aerobic capacity of 48 mL/kg/min and 27% of those 
arrested had an aerobic capacity of less than 42 mL/kg/min.8 
Based upon these reports, the District Court held that 
SEPTA established that its aerobic capacity requirement is 
job related and consistent with business necessity. See 
Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at *35. 
 
The District Court also found support for this conclusion 
in an expert report submitted on behalf of SEPTA by Dr. 
Robert Moffatt. Dr. Moffatt simulated a training course and 
concluded that officers with aerobic capacities of 45 
mL/kg/min or better had a 7-8% decrement in their ability 
to perform physical activities after a run of approximately 
three minutes; officers with an aerobic capacity of less than 
45 mL/kg/min exhibited a 30% decrement in physical 
ability after the same run. The District Court found that Dr. 
Moffatt's study demonstrates "the manifest relationship of 
aerobic capacity to the critical and important duties of a 
SEPTA transit police officer . . . ." Id. at *68. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "Arrest rates" were tabulated by expressing the number of arrests 
made by an officer as a percentage of the number of incident reports 
involving that officer. See App. at 3040-41 (Siskin Expert Report). 
 
8. The category of "serious crimes" includes homicide, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, theft, and auto theft. This category of 
arrests accounts for approximately ten percent of all reported incidents 
and seven percent of all reported arrests. See App. at 3040. (Siskin 
Expert Report). 
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The District Court entered judgment in favor of SEPTA on 
all claims. Both the individual plaintiffs and the United 
States have taken appeals from the District Court'sfinal 
judgment, over which we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. On appeal, the individual plaintiffs assert 
that the District Court applied incorrect legal standards in 
evaluating SEPTA's business necessity defense and that the 
District Court made erroneous findings of fact in 
determining that SEPTA's 1.5 mile run does not violate Title 
VII. Although the United States initially challenged SEPTA's 
implementation of its entire physical fitness test, on appeal 
the United States joins the individual plaintiffs in asserting 
error solely with respect to the District Court's 
determination that SEPTA's 1.5 mile run is not violative of 
Title VII. Because the issue of whether the District Court 





Under Title VII's disparate impact theory of liability, 
plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by 
demonstrating that application of a facially neutral 
standard has resulted in a significantly discriminatory 
hiring pattern. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 
329 (1977). Once the plaintiffs have established a prima 
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show that 
the employment practice is "job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity . . . ." 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-2k. Should the employer meet this burden, 
the plaintiffs may still prevail if they can show that an 
alternative employment practice has a less disparate impact 
and would also serve the employer's legitimate business 
interest. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 
425 (1975). 
 
Because SEPTA concedes that its 1.5 mile run has a 
disparate impact on women, the first prong of the disparate 
impact analysis is not at issue in this appeal.9 Rather, this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. On appeal, SEPTA offered evidence to establish that the individual 
female applicants who failed SEPTA's 1.5 mile run demonstrated a 
cavalier attitude in preparing for and taking the test. As aptly noted by 
plaintiffs' counsel at oral argument, this evidence has no bearing upon 
our analysis in this appeal because SEPTA has conceded that its test 
has a severe disparate impact on women. 
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appeal focuses our attention on the proper standard for 
evaluating whether SEPTA's 1.5 mile run is "job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity" under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Because the 
Act instructs that this standard incorporates only selected 
segments of prior Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
business necessity doctrine, we examine the history of this 




The disparate impact theory of discrimination under Title 
VII was judicially created in the seminal case of Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In embracing 
disparate impact, the Court recognized that Title VII was 
meant not only to proscribe overt discrimination, but also 
to prohibit "practices that are fair in form, but 
discriminatory in operation." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. The 
Court made clear that what is required by Title VII is "the 
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to 
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification." Id. Accordingly, the Court announced that in 
evaluating practices fair in form but discriminatory in 
operation, "[t]he touchstone is business necessity." Id. 
 
The Court, however, was unclear in articulating what an 
employer must show to demonstrate business necessity. 
The Court couched the employer's burden in terms of 
showing that its practice is "related to job performance"; 
"bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful 
performance of the jobs for which it was used"; has "a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question"; and 
is "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance." 
Id. at 431, 432, 436. In applying this standard, however, 
the Court rejected the employer's justification in Griggs that 
its standardized intelligence tests and diploma 
requirements generally would improve the overall quality of 
the work force in its power plant. The Court held that, 
although these requirements may be useful, they could not 
be used to exclude disproportionately a protected group 
when the employer failed to show that they do not test an 
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applicant's ability to perform the job in question. Id. at 431- 
33. 
 
The Court next spoke to the issue of business necessity 
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In 
Albemarle, an employer sought to justify the use of verbal 
exam and high school diploma requirements in determining 
whether to promote employees to more skilled positions in 
its paper mill. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 408-11. In 
preparation for trial, the employer hired an industrial 
psychologist to complete validation studies showing that 
the tests were job related because they had a statistically 
significant correlation with supervisorial ratings in several 
groups of the jobs in question. Id. at 429-30. The Court, 
nevertheless, rejected the employer's contention that its 
requirements were job related. 
 
The Court held that "discriminatory tests are 
impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable 
methods, to be `predicative of or significantly correlated 
with important elements of work behavior which comprise 
or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are 
being evaluated.' " Id. at 431 (quoting 29 CFR S 1607.4(c)). 
In so holding, the Court noted that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines for 
professional standards of test validation are entitled to 
great deference in determining whether an employer has 
demonstrated that its requirements are job related. Id. at 
430-31. The Court rejected the employer's validation 
studies as inadequate in several respects under the EEOC 
Guidelines. For example, the Court rejected the studies 
because they focused on the most qualified employees near 
the top of the line of progression, stating: 
 
       The fact that the best of those employees working near 
       the top of a line of progression score well on a test does 
       not necessarily mean that that test, or some particular 
       cutoff score on the test, is a permissible measure of the 
       minimal qualifications of new workers entering lower 
       level jobs. 
 
Id. at 434. The Court accordingly held that consideration 
must be given to the possible use of testing as a promotion 
device rather than as a screen for entry into lower level 
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jobs. Id. Due to several inadequacies of the employer's 
validation studies, the Court held that the employer had 
failed to show that its requirements were job related to the 
position in question. Id. at 435-36. 
 
The next Title VII case to raise the business necessity 
issue for the Court's consideration was Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).10 In Dothard, female 
applicants challenged a prison's minimum height and 
weight requirements for its prison guard positions as 
violative of Title VII. On the issue of business necessity, the 
Court made clear that "a discriminatory employment 
practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and 
efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." 
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. The Court rejected the 
prison's assertion that height and weight requirements have 
a relationship to the unspecified amount of strength 
essential to effective job performance, holding that if 
strength is a bona fide job related quality, the prison could 
test for it directly by adopting and validating a fairly 
administered strength test. Id. at 331-32. 
 
The Court's next definitive statement on the business 
necessity doctrine is found in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), where a majority of the 
Court deviated from its previous business necessity 
jurisprudence in adopting a more liberal test for business 
necessity.11 According to the Court: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Prior to Dothard, the Court included some language related to the 
business necessity doctrine in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), 
an equal protection case. Because Washington is not a Title VII case, 
however, we cannot treat the language in Washington as reflective of the 
pre-Wards Cove business necessity doctrine applicable to Title VII cases. 
 
11. Two cases prior to Wards Cove forecast some of the changes to come. 
In New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Court 
disposed of a Title VII case by holding that the plaintiffs failed to 
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact. The Court, however, 
commented on the business necessity doctrine in dicta. In a footnote, 
the Court stated that even if a prima facie case had been established, 
the employer would have shown business necessity by establishing that 
its practice significantly serves its legitimate business goals of safety 
and 
efficiency. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31. Similarly, a plurality opinion 
in 
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       [T]he dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice 
       serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment 
       goals of the employer. The touchstone of this inquiry is 
       a reasoned review of the employer's justification for his 
       use of the challenged practice. A mere insubstantial 
       justification in this regard will not suffice, because 
       such a low standard of review would permit 
       discrimination to be practiced through the use of 
       spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices. At 
       the same time, though, there is no requirement that 
       the challenged practice be "essential" or 
       "indispensable" to the employer's business for it to 
       pass muster . . . . 
 
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted). In 
addition, the Court made clear that at the business 
necessity stage of Title VII litigation, the employer bears 
only the burden of production; the burden of persuasion 
remains on the disparate impact plaintiff at all times. Id. As 
we have previously recognized, the Wards Cove standard 
may reasonably be viewed as a departure from the more 
stringent business necessity standard under Griggs and its 
progeny. See Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of 
Harrison, New Jersey, 940 F.2d 792, 803 (3d Cir. 
1991)(noting that Wards Cove "arguably diluted the 




In response to Wards Cove, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. One of the primary purposes of the Act 
was "to codify the concepts of `business necessity' and `job 
related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), suggested that 
employers could meet their burden of establishing business necessity 
simply by advancing a legitimate business reason for the practice in 
question. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. While the language in these cases 
clearly foreshadowed the Court's holding in Wards Cove, this language 
had never been embraced by a majority of the Court as the binding 
standard for business necessity prior to Wards Cove. 
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Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
490 U.S. 642 (1989)." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 
102-166, S 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1992). As part of this 
codification of Griggs, the Act made clear that both the 
burden of production and the burden of persuasion in 
establishing business necessity rest with the employer. See 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(k). 
 
In addition, the Act codified the business necessity 
doctrine by using the following language: 
 
        An unlawful employment practice based on disparate 
       impact is established under this subchapter only if-- 
 
        (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a 
       respondent uses a particular employment practice that 
       causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, 
       religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails 
       to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
       related for the position in question and consistent with 
       business necessity; or 
 
        (ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration 
       described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an 
       alternative employment practice and the respondent 
       refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(emphasis added). The Act 
further instructs that in interpreting its business necessity 
language, "[n]o statements other than the interpretive 
memorandum . . . shall be considered legislative history of, 
or relied upon in any way as legislative history . .. ." Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-166, S 105(b), 105 Stat. 
1071, 1075 (1992). The interpretive memorandum 
referenced in this portion of the Act states in relevant part: 
 
       The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are 
       intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the 
       Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
       424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions 
       prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
       642 (1989). 
 
137 Cong. Rec. 28,680 (1991). After the passage of the Act, 
proponents of both a strict test for business necessity and 
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a more liberal requirement claimed victory in the standard 




The Supreme Court has yet to interpret the "job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity" standard adopted by the Act. In addition, our 
sister courts of appeals that have applied the Act's 
standard to a Title VII challenge have done so with little 
analysis. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 
1112, 1117-18 (11th Cir. 1993)(noting that Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 statutorily reversed Wards Cove but ruling in favor 
of employer because practice was demonstrably necessary 
to meet an "important business goal"); Bradley v. Pizzaco of 
Nebraska, Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1993)(noting 
that Griggs standard was reinstated by the Act and holding 
that employer failed to meet Griggs standard). 
 
Because the Act proscribes resort to legislative history 
with the exception of one short interpretive memorandum 
endorsing selective caselaw, our starting point in 
interpreting the Act's business necessity language must be 
that interpretive memorandum. The memorandum makes 
clear that Congress intended to endorse the business 
necessity standard enunciated in Griggs and not the Wards 
Cove interpretation of that standard. By Congress' 
distinguishing between Griggs and Wards Cove, we must 
conclude that Congress viewed Wards Cove as a significant 
departure from Griggs. Accordingly, because the Act clearly 
chooses Griggs over Wards Cove, the Court's interpretation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense 
to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 
N.C. L. Rev. 1479, 1516-20 (1996)(outlining the respective positions of 
both sides to the debate); compare also Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact 
Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1153 
(1993)(arguing that Wards Cove is still good law after Civil Rights Act of 
1991); with Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 387 (1996)(arguing 
for a strict business necessity standard under the Act); Note, The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard , 106 Harv. L. Rev. 
896 (1993)(asserting that Wards Cove does not survive the Act). 
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of the business necessity standard in Wards Cove  does not 
survive the Act.13 
 
We turn now to articulate the standard for business 
necessity - one most consistent with Griggs and its pre- 
Wards Cove progeny. The laudable mission begun by the 
Court in Griggs was the eradication of discrimination 
through the application of practices fair in form but 
discriminatory in practice by eliminating unnecessary 
barriers to employment opportunities. In the context of a 
hiring exam with a cutoff score shown to have a 
discriminatory effect, the standard that best effectuates this 
mission is implicit in the Court's application of the 
business necessity doctrine to the employer in Griggs, i.e., 
that a discriminatory cutoff score is impermissible unless 
shown to measure the minimum qualifications necessary 
for successful performance of the job in question. Only this 
standard can effectuate the mission begun by the Court in 
Griggs; only by requiring employers to demonstrate that 
their discriminatory cutoff score measures the minimum 
qualifications necessary for successful performance of the 
job in question can we be certain to eliminate the use of 
excessive cutoff scores that have a disparate impact on 
minorities as a method of imposing unnecessary barriers to 
employment opportunities. 
 
The evolution of the Court's articulation of the business 
necessity doctrine in both Albemarle and Dothard reinforces 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. We are cognizant that a contrary argument has been advanced in 
which it is asserted that Wards Cove remains the controlling standard. 
See Carvin, supra note 12, at 1157-64. Pursuant to the argument, the 
business necessity standard announced in Wards Cove simply clarified 
Griggs and therefore is not inconsistent with the Act's command to apply 
the standard enunciated in Griggs. In addition, it is asserted that due to 
the legislative history of the Act, it would be improper to apply a strict 
business necessity standard. This argument, however, ignores two 
important aspects of the Act which constrain our interpretation of the 
standard adopted. First, the interpretive memorandum's distinction 
between Griggs and Wards Cove casts significant doubt on the assertion 
that Congress read Wards Cove as simply a clarification of Griggs. 
Second, the Act precludes us from considering the legislative history 
upon which this argument relies for support. Accordingly, we find this 
argument to be devoid of merit. 
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the conclusion that this standard is both implicit in Griggs 
and central to its mission. In Albemarle, the Court 
explained that discriminatory tests must be validated to 
show that they are "predictive of . . . important elements of 
work behavior which comprise . . . the job . . . for which 
candidates are being evaluated" and that the scores of the 
higher level employees do not necessarily validate a cutoff 
score for the minimum qualifications to perform the job at 
an entry level. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431, 434. This is 
simply another way of saying that discriminatory cutoff 
scores must be validated to show they measure the 
minimum qualifications necessary for successful 
performance of the job. Similarly, in Dothard, the Court 
made clear that "a discriminatory employment practice," 
such as a discriminatory cutoff score on an entry level 
exam, "must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient 
job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." Dothard, 
433 U.S. at 332 n.14. 
 
Taken together, Griggs, Albemarle and Dothard teach that 
in order to show the business necessity of a discriminatory 
cutoff score an employer must demonstrate that its cutoff 
measures the minimum qualifications necessary for 
successful performance of the job in question. Furthermore, 
because the Act instructs us to interpret its business 
necessity language in conformance with Griggs and its pre- 
Wards Cove progeny, we must conclude that the Act's 
business necessity language incorporates this standard. 
 
Our conclusion that the Act incorporates this standard is 
further supported by the business necessity language 
adopted by the Act. Congress chose the terms "job related 
for the position in question" and "consistent with business 
necessity." Judicial application of a standard focusing 
solely on whether the qualities measured by an entry level 
exam bear some relationship to the job in question would 
impermissibly write out the business necessity prong of the 
Act's chosen standard. With respect to a discriminatory 
cutoff score, the business necessity prong must be read to 
demand an inquiry into whether the score reflects the 
minimum qualifications necessary to perform successfully 
the job in question. See also EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 
S1607.5 (H) (noting that cutoff scores should "be set so as 
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to be reasonable and consistent with normal expectations 
of acceptable proficiency within the work force."). 
 
In addition, Congress' decision to emphasize the 
importance of the policies underlying the disparate impact 
theory of discrimination through its codification supports 
application of this standard to discriminatory cutoff scores. 
The disparate impact theory of discrimination combats not 
intentional, obvious discriminatory policies, but a type of 
covert discrimination in which facially neutral practices are 
employed to exclude, unnecessarily and disparately, 
protected groups from employment opportunities. Inherent 
in the adoption of this theory of discrimination is the 
recognition that an employer's job requirements may 
incorporate societal standards based not upon necessity 
but rather upon historical, discriminatory biases. 14 A 
business necessity standard that wholly defers to an 
employer's judgment as to what is desirable in an employee 
therefore is completely inadequate in combating covert 
discrimination based upon societal prejudices. Only a 
business necessity doctrine that examines discriminatory 
cutoff scores in light of the minimum qualifications that are 
necessary to perform the job in question successfully can 
address adequately this subtle form of discrimination.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. For an interesting discussion on male-oriented biases in the labor 
market see Maxine N. Eichner, Getting Women Work That Isn't Women's 
Work: Challenging Gender Biases in the Workplace Under Title VII, 97 
Yale L.J. 1397 (1988). See also, Hurley v. The Atlantic City Police Dept., 
___ F.3d. ___, ___ n.5, 1999 WL 150301 (3d Cir. 1999)(noting egregious 
sexual harassment to which a female police officer was subjected by her 
male colleagues); Mazus v. Department of Transp., Com. of Pa., 629 F.2d 
870, 876 (3d Cir. 1980)(Sloviter, J., dissenting)(noting allegations 
demonstrating prevalent male attitude that construction work is not the 
"type of work" women should perform). 
 
15. We need not be concerned that implementation of this standard will 
result in forcing employers to adopt quotas, a result that would be 
inconsistent with the mandates of Title VII. If an employer can 
demonstrate that its discriminatory cutoff score reflects the minimum 
qualifications necessary for successful job performance, it will be able 
to 
continue to use it. If not, the employer must abandon that cutoff score, 
but is free to develop either a non-discriminatory practice which furthers 
its goals, or an equally discriminatory practice that can meet this 
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Accordingly, we hold that the business necessity 
standard adopted by the Act must be interpreted in 
accordance with the standards articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Griggs and its pre-Wards Cove progeny which 
demand that a discriminatory cutoff score be shown to 
measure the minimum qualifications necessary for the 
successful performance of the job in question in order to 
survive a disparate impact challenge.16  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
standard. Nothing in the Griggs business necessity standard requires 
employers to hire employees in numbers to reflect the ethnic, racial or 
gender make-up of the community. 
 
The following example based upon the facts of this case illustrates this 
point. Assuming that SEPTA's 1.5 mile run has a disparate impact on 
women and that SEPTA can not show that the 12 minute cutoff 
measures the minimum aerobic capacity necessary to be a successful 
transit officer, it does not follow that SEPTA would then be required to 
hire women in equal proportion to men. Several options would be 
available to SEPTA. For example, SEPTA could: 1) abandon the test as 
a hiring requirement but maintain an incentive program to encourage an 
increase in the officers' aerobic capacities; 2) validate a cutoff score 
for 
aerobic capacity that measures the minimum capacity necessary to 
successfully perform the job and maintain incentive programs to achieve 
even higher aerobic levels; or 3) institute a non-discriminatory test for 
excessive levels of aerobic capacity such as a test that would exclude 
80% of men as well as 80% of women through separate aerobic capacity 
cutoffs for the different sexes. Each of these options would help SEPTA 
achieve its stated goal of increasing aerobic capacity without running 
afoul of Title VII and none of these options require hiring by quota. 
 
16. Relying upon Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th 
Cir. 
1972), and like cases from our sister courts of appeals, the dissent 
asserts that this standard should not apply to SEPTA because the job of 
SEPTA transit officer implicates issues of public safety. Under the Act, 
however, our interpretation of the business necessity language is limited 
to "the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court 
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989)." See 137 Cong. Rec. 28,680 (1991)(emphasis added). Because the 
Supreme Court never adopted the holding of Spurlock prior to Wards 
Cove, its is clear that, under the Act, we are not to consider Spurlock as 
authoritative. Furthermore, if Congress had intended to endorse the 
holding of Spurlock, it could have done so affirmatively. Accordingly, 
because the Act limits our interpretation to Supreme Court 
 




Although the District Court purported to apply the Act's 
"job related to the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity" standard to SEPTA's cutoff score on its 
1.5 mile run, it is clear from the District Court's 
memorandum opinion that it did not apply the standard we 
have found to be implicit in Griggs and incorporated by the 
Act. The District Court rejected the formulation of the 
Griggs standard found in Dothard, characterizing it as 
dicta, and relied instead upon language found in New York 
City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). As our 
prior discussion makes clear,17 the Beazer language is dicta 
and the Dothard standard is binding under the Act. 
Moreover, the Beazer dicta upon which the District Court 
relied mirrors the standard adopted by Wards Cove. 
Compare Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at *54 (noting that in 
Beazer, the Court "implicitly approves employment 
practices that significantly serve, but are neither required 
by nor necessary to, the employer's legitimate business 
interests") with Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (stating that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jurisprudence and does not otherwise endorse Spurlock, we are not at 
liberty to adopt the holding of Spurlock at this juncture. Moreover, to 
the 
extent that Spurlock and other cases from our sister courts of appeals 
can be read to suggest that minimum qualifications do not apply to 
certain types of employment, these cases are inconsistent with the 
teachings of Griggs and are accordingly uninformative under the Act. 
 
Furthermore, to the limited extent that the Supreme Court's pre-Wards 
Cove jurisprudence instructs that public safety is a legitimate 
consideration, application of the business necessity standard to SEPTA 
is consistent with that jurisprudence because the standard itself takes 
public safety into consideration. If, for example, SEPTA can show on 
remand that the inability of a SEPTA transit officer to meet a certain 
aerobic level would significantly jeopardize public safety, this showing 
would be relevant to determine if that level is necessary for the 
successful performance of the job. Clearly a SEPTA officer who poses a 
significant risk to public safety could not be considered to be performing 
his job successfully. We are accordingly confident that application of the 
business necessity standard to SEPTA is fully consistent with the 
Supreme Court's pre-Wards Cove jurisprudence as required by the Act. 
 
17. See supra note 11. 
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standard is "whether a challenged practice serves, in a 
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the 
employer" and noting that there is no requirement that the 
practice be essential). As we previously stated, the Wards 
Cove standard does not survive the Act. 
 
The District Court's application of its understanding of 
business necessity to SEPTA's business justification further 
illustrates that the District Court did not apply the correct 
legal standard. As an initial matter, the District Court 
seemed to conclude that Dr. Davis' expertise alone is 
sufficient to justify the 42.5 mL/kg/min aerobic capacity 
cutoff measured by the 1.5 mile run.18  This conclusion 
disregards the teachings of Griggs, Albemarle and Dothard 
in which the Court made clear that judgment alone is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. While relying predominately upon Dr. Davis' expertise, the District 
Court does point to a study which Dr. Davis completed for Anne Arundel 
County, Maryland in which he concluded that a 42.5 mL/kg/min aerobic 
capacity predicted success as an Anne Arundel County police officer. 
Absent a finding that the work of an Anne Arundel County police officer 
is comparable to SEPTA transit officer work, afinding the District Court 
did not make, reliance on this validation study is misplaced. See 29 
C.F.R. S 1607.7 (B)(2); see also 29 C.F.R. S 1607.7(B)(3)(explaining that 
validation studies created for other employers must also include a study 
of "test fairness"). Furthermore, it is unclear from Dr. Davis' report 
whether the Anne Arundel study's 42.5 mL/kg/min cutoff actually 
measures for qualities significant to SEPTA transit police performance. 
Compare App. at 3134 (Davis Report) (noting that 42.5 mL/kg/min level 
for Anne Arundel study is significant for carrying an unspecified amount 
of weight and generally effecting arrests) with App. at 3132 (Davis 
Report) (stating "[t]ransit police officers are more likely to have 
incidents 
come to them, as opposed to responding to the scene of an event. By 
mission, the presence of the officer is that of a deterrent, maintaining 
maximum visibility. Occasionally, officers will come upon criminal 
activities such as assaults or robberies, but for the most part, the 
officer 
will attempt to control a situation such as disorderly conduct or force 
compliance (paying fares) without having to make an arrest."); see also 
App. at 3139 (Davis Report)(quoting experienced officer as stating "[t]he 
most important factors in my opinion of being a good officer is to be able 
to think clearly at all times an [sic] verbalize and or articulate when 
dealing with all people . . . . Running quickly is physically demanding, 
although in the transit system, most dealings are close, physical 
altercations."). In addition, it is unclear from the record whether the 
Anne Arundel study itself was properly validated. 
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insufficient to validate an employer's discriminatory 
practices.19 More fundamentally, however, nowhere in its 
extensive opinion did the District Court consider whether 
Dr. Davis' 42.5 mL/kg/min cutoff reflects the minimum 
aerobic capacity necessary to perform successfully the job 
of SEPTA transit police officer. 
 
Instead, the District Court upheld this cutoff because it 
was "readily justifiable." Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at *57.20 
The validation studies of SEPTA's experts upon which the 
District Court relied to support this conclusion demonstrate 
the extent to which this standard is insufficient under the 
Act. The general import of these studies is that the higher 
an officer's aerobic capacity, the better the officer is able to 
perform the job. Setting aside the validity of these studies, 
this conclusion alone does not validate Dr. Davis' 42.5 
mL/kg/min cutoff under the Act's business necessity  
standard.21 At best, these studies show that aerobic 
 
(Text continued on page 24) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The danger of allowing an employer to carry its burden by relying 
simply upon an expert's unvalidated judgment as to an appropriate 
cutoff score in a testing device is illustrated by this case. In 
determining 
an appropriate cutoff for aerobic capacity, Dr. Davis rejected the SMEs' 
estimate of the minimal qualifications necessary to perform the job even 
though these SMEs were experienced transit officers. Dr. Davis then 
determined that "a SEPTA transit officer needs an aerobic capacity of 50 
mL/kg/min to successfully perform a number of tasks." Lanning, 1998 
WL 341605 at *16 (emphasis added). Dr. Davis, however, revised this 
requirement, finding that "the goals of SEPTA could be satisfied by using 
a 42.5 mL/kg/min standard" after determining that the higher limit 
would have a "draconian" effect on women. Id. There is no indication in 
the District Court's opinion as to how Dr. Davis determined that the 
lower standard would be sufficient. Where, as here, the cutoff score 
chosen has a discriminatory disparate impact, Griggs prohibits the 
establishment of exactly this type of arbitrary barrier to employment 
opportunities. 
 
20. The District Court seems to have derived this standard from the 
Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures 
("SIOP Principle"), principles published by the Society for Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology as a professional guideline for conducting 
validation research and personnel selection. To the extent that the SIOP 
Principles are inconsistent with the mission of Griggs and the business 
necessity standard adopted by the Act, they are not instructive. 
21. The Court has cautioned that studies done in anticipation of 
litigation to validate discriminatory employment tests that have already 
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been given must be examined with great care due to the danger of lack 
of objectivity. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 433 n.32. We also have warned in 
a disparate impact context that "the story statistics tell depends, not 
unlike beauty, upon the eye and ear of the beholder" and that "we must 
apply a critical and cautious ear to one dimensional statistical 
presentation." Bryant v. International Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 
573 
(3d Cir. 1982). A critical evaluation of the statistical studies relied 
upon 
by the District Court in this case, reveals several aspects of these 
studies 
that we find to be, at a minimum, disconcerting. 
 
The following concerns are only a representative sample of possible 
deficiencies in these studies: 1) While the ability to make an arrest may 
be an important aspect of the job, the absolute number of arrests or 
"arrest rates" do not necessarily correlate with successful job 
performance. See App. at 3132 (noting that SEPTA officer should 
generally attempt to control a situation without having to make an 
arrest); 2) The study on arrests and arrest rates examined a 
disproportionately large number of officers with an aerobic capacity over 
42 mL/kg/min compared to the number of officers with an aerobic 
capacity under that level which likely skewed the results. See, e.g., App. 
at 3053 (comparing arrests of 231 officers with aerobic capacities under 
the 42 mL/kg/min with arrests of 813 officers with aerobic capacities 
over the 42 mL/kg/min); see also, 29 C.F.R.S 1607.14(B)(6)(noting that 
"[r]eliance upon a selection procedure which is significantly related to a 
criterion measure, but which is based upon a study involving a large 
number of subjects and has a low correlation coefficient will be subject 
to close review if it has a large adverse impact."); 3) The comparison of 
aerobic capacity with commendations is not helpful absent finding as to 
the subjective considerations involved in awarding commendations. See 
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 432-33; 4) The studies' emphasis on arrests for 
"serious crimes" is suspect; these arrests account for only 7% of all 
arrests and therefore represent only a small aspect of job. See generally 
29 C.F.R. S 1607.14(B)(6)(noting that reliance on single selection 
instrument which is related to only one of many job duties will be 
subject to close review); 5) SEPTA's table on thefield performance of its 
officers belies the contention that there is a strict linear relationship 
of 
arrests to aerobic capacity; officers at less than 37 mL/kg/min had an 
average arrests of 13.6 compared to officers with at least a 48 
mL/kg/min level who had average arrests of 13.9. See App. at 3065 
(Defendant's Exhibit 52D); 6) The study on the average aerobic capacity 
of perpetrators has little meaning unless SEPTA can show that arrests of 
these perpetrators are typically aerobic contests; because SEPTA police 
are armed, such a showing is unlikely. 
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capacity is related to the job of SEPTA transit officer. A 
study showing that "more is better," however, has no 
bearing on the appropriate cutoff to reflect the minimal 
qualifications necessary to perform successfully the job in 
question. 
 
Dr. Siskin's testimony is particularly instructive on this 
point. Dr. Siskin testified that in view of the linear 
relationship between aerobic capacity and the arrest 
parameters, any cutoff score can be justified since higher 
aerobic capacity levels will get you more field performance 
(i.e., "more is better"). See Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at 
*41. Under the District Court's understanding of business 
necessity, which requires only that a cutoff score be 
"readily justifiable," SEPTA, as well as any other employer 
whose jobs entail any level of physical capability, could 
employ an unnecessarily high cutoff score on its physical 
abilities entrance exam in an effort to exclude virtually all 
women by justifying this facially neutral yet discriminatory 
practice on the theory that more is better.22 This result 
contravenes Griggs and demonstrates why, under Griggs, a 
discriminatory cutoff score must be shown to measure the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Because we are remanding for the District Court to reconsider this 
evidence in light of the Griggs standard, we need not rule on whether 
any of the District Court's prior findings as to these studies were 
clearly 
erroneous. We comment here on the validity of these studies only to 
draw the District Court's attention to these concerns and to encourage 




22. Such a result has the potential to have a significant detrimental 
impact on the amount and type of employment opportunities available to 
women. Obviously, under a "more is better" theory, employers such as 
police departments, fire departments and correctional facilities could 
develop physical tests with unnecessarily high cutoffs that would 
effectively exclude women from their ranks. Perhaps less obvious, 
however, is the impact that this result could have on industries where 
strength even minimally related to the job in question. For example, all 
companies engaged in delivery, construction or any other type of 
physical labor would be permitted to develop unnecessary strength 
requirements on the theory that "more is better" or "the stronger the 
worker, the faster the job gets done." This result is clearly unacceptable 
given the policies underlying both Title VII and the disparate impact 
theory of discrimination. 
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minimum qualifications necessary to perform successfully 




For the foregoing reasons, it is clear to us that the 
District Court did not employ the business necessity 
standard implicit in Griggs and incorporated by the Act 
which requires that a discriminatory cutoff score be shown 
to measure the minimum qualifications necessary for 
successful performance of the job in question in order to 
survive a disparate impact challenge. We will therefore 
vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand this 
appeal for the District Court to determine whether SEPTA 
has carried its burden of establishing that its 1.5 mile run 
measures the minimum aerobic capacity necessary to 
perform successfully the job of SEPTA transit police officer.24 
Because this is the first occasion we have had to clarify the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. This is not to say that studies that actually prove that "more is 
better" are always irrelevant to validation of an employer's 
discriminatory 
practice. For example, a content validated exam, such as a typing exam 
for the position of typist, which demonstrates that the applicants who 
score higher on the exam will exhibit better job performance may justify 
a rank-ordering hiring practice that is discriminatory. In such a case, a 
validation study proving that "more is better" may suffice to validate the 
rank-order hiring. This is true, however, in only the rarest of cases 
where the exam tests for qualities that fairly represent the totality of a 
job's responsibilities. It is unlikely that such a study could validate 
rank- 
hiring with a discriminatory impact based upon physical attributes in 
complex jobs such as that of police officer in which qualities such as 
intelligence, judgment, and experience surely play a critical role. This 
is 
especially true in SEPTA's case, where the record indicates that SEPTA 
patrol officers encounter "running assists," the most strenuous task 
upon which SEPTA's aerobic capacity testing predominately was 
justified, at an average rate of only twice per year. Compare Lanning, 
1998 WL 341605 at *5 (finding that SEPTA has approximately 380 
running assists per year) with id. at *27 (noting that SEPTA has 190 
patrol officers). 
 
24. The District Court rejected as irrelevant the plaintiffs' evidence 
that 
incumbent officers had failed the physical fitness test yet successfully 
performed the job and that other police forces function well without an 
aerobic capacity admission test. See Lanning, 1998 WL 341605 at *68- 
*70. Under the standard implicit in Griggs and incorporated into the Act, 
this evidence tends to show that SEPTA's cutoff score for aerobic 
capacity does not correlate with the minimum qualifications necessary to 
perform successfully the job of SEPTA transit officer. Accordingly, this 
evidence is relevant and should be considered by the District Court on 
remand. 
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Act's business necessity standard, on remand the District 
Court may wish to exercise its discretion to allow the 
parties to develop further the record in keeping with the 
standard announced here. 
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WEIS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
The "minimum qualifications" criterion of business 
justification does not apply to all types of employment. 
When public safety is at stake, a lighter burden is placed 
on employers to justify their hiring requirements. Because 





Concerned about its inability to control crime on its 
property, SEPTA instituted a three-pronged attack on the 
problem. It added a substantial number of officers, 
implemented a zone method of patrol, and adopted 
standards to improve the generally poor physical condition 
of its officers. Unlike many metropolitan police 
departments, SEPTA officers are deployed alone and on 
foot, engaging in physical activities more frequently than 
other law enforcement agencies. 
 
The patrol zones present significant variations in 
conditions that affect the physical exertion of officers in the 
performance of their duties. Zone One, for example, has a 
climb of 30 to 50 steps from street level. Zone Three, a 
mixture of above- and below-ground locations, borders a 
large shopping mall, featuring retail theft and pursuits that 
lead into the SEPTA transit system. Zone Five, which 
includes sports complexes, is characterized by long 
distances between stations. Zone Six includes the Temple 
University area, a scene of frequent crimes against 
students. 
 
SEPTA officers must occasionally ask for assistance from 
their comrades in other zones. These calls are divided into 
two categories, "officer assists" and "officer backups." An 
"assist" requires officers to respond immediately. Often the 
only method available to get to the scene quickly is a run 
of five to eight city blocks. An officer responding to an 
"assist" must preserve enough energy to deal effectively 
with a situation once arriving on the scene. SEPTA averages 
about 380 running assists per year. "Backups" are not as 
critical as "assists," so officers generally use a "paced jog." 
SEPTA averages about 1,920 "backups" annually. 
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For help in attaining its fitness goals, SEPTA turned to 
Dr. Paul Davis, an acknowledged expert in the field who 
had recommended corrective measures for numerous law 
enforcement and government agencies. At the time Dr. 
Davis began his research for SEPTA, an officer's equipment 
load was 12 pounds; it is now nearly 26 pounds. Dr. Davis 
found that officers need "sound, intact, disease-free 
cardiovascular system[s]" to effectively perform their jobs. 
These requirements implicate aerobic capacity, i.e., the 
ability of the body to utilize oxygen during sustained 
physical activities such as running, swimming, and cycling. 
Aerobic capacity is commonly measured in units of 
milliliters of oxygen per kilogram of body weight per minute 
-- "mL/kg/min," or "mL." 
 
SEPTA officers typically run or jog on a daily basis from 
three to eight city blocks for periods of three to ten 
minutes. They also engage in stair climbing, which requires 
a capacity of 54 mL. In light of this and other evidence, Dr. 
Davis concluded that SEPTA transit officers need an 
aerobic capacity of 50 mL. After determining that such a 
level would have a "draconian" effect on female applicants, 
however, Dr. Davis lowered his recommendation to 42.5 
mL. That capacity could be demonstrated by running 1.5 
miles in 12 minutes, a test that was adopted for applicants. 
 
Dr. Davis had done a similar study for a fire department 
in St. Paul, Minnesota, which -- in setting a standard of 45 
mL -- required applicants to run 1.5 miles in 11 minutes 
and 40 seconds. Eighty percent of male applicants and 76% 
of female applicants passed this test. 
 
In addition to Dr. Davis' testimony, SEPTA also presented 
evidence from other experts to demonstrate a statistically 
significant correlation between aerobic capacity and the 
number of arrests made by individual SEPTA officers. 
Furthermore, of 207 commendations, 96% went to officers 
with an average capacity of 46 mL. Of these awards, 198 
involved arrests, and 116 involved a foot pursuit, use of 
force or other physical exertion. Another study indicated 
that 51.9% of offense perpetrators had a capacity of 48 mL 
or higher, with only 27% having lower than a 42 mL rating. 
 
The record demonstrates that a smaller percentage of 
female applicants passed the running test than males, but 
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that nearly all women who trained for it were able to pass. 
The named plaintiffs and some of the class members who 
failed demonstrated, for the most part, a "cavalier" attitude 
towards the running test. Videotapes showed some of these 
applicants walking at the halfway point, either because 
they were indifferent or unable to run for even that short a 
period of time. Thus, although there was a significant 
disparity between the pass-fail rates of male and female 
applicants, the extent of the difference appears to have 
been exaggerated to some extent by the approach taken by 
some of the applicants. 
 
A physiologist, Dr. Lynda Ransdell, testified that 40% of 
all women starting at an aerobic capacity of 35 to 37 mL 
can train to pass the running test in eight weeks, and that 
10% of all women between 20 and 29 years of age can do 
so without any training. She concluded that the average 
sedentary woman can achieve SEPTA's performance 
standard with only moderate training. SEPTA sent 
applicants a letter outlining recommended training 
techniques that Dr. Ransdell testified were adequate. 
 
Plaintiffs introduced the testimony of Dr. William 
McArdle, who suggested the use of a "relativefitness" test 
in which all applicants would be required to meet the 50th 
percentile of aerobic capacity for their gender-- 
approximately 42 mL for males, and 36 mL for females. 
However, Dr. Robert Moffatt, a defense expert who 
conducted tests of the aerobic capacity necessary to 
perform a SEPTA officer's duties, disagreed. He stated that 
female officers with a capacity of 36 mL would not be able 
to capably perform their duties after running to an"assist" 
or a "backup." Dr. Bernard Siskin, another defense expert, 
found that the arrest rate for females with a 36 mL capacity 
was significantly lower than that of males with a 42 mL 
capacity. 
 
The District Court rejected Dr. McArdle's proposal 
because it would not serve SEPTA's business goal of 
providing a police force capable of performing the physical 
requirements of the job nearly as well as the existing test. 
Instead, the court found that "Dr. Davis' study, standing 
alone, met the professional standards for construct 
validation and satisfies defendant's burden of 
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demonstrating job relatedness and business necessity." 
Moreover, his study had sufficient empirical support for an 




The dispute in this case centers on the applicable 
standard of business justification under the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I,S 105(a), 105 Stat. 
1074-75 (adding 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(k)). The pertinent 
section provides: "An unlawful employment practice based 
on disparate impact is established . . . only if-- [the] 
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate 
impact on the basis of . . . sex . . . and the respondent fails 
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity[.]" 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
 
This addition to Title VII was passed in response to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In that case, the Court held 
that after a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of 
disparate impact, the defendant bears the burden to 
produce evidence of business justification. See id. at 659. 
The burden of persuasion, however, remains at all times 
with the plaintiff. See id. As to what showing would satisfy 
business justification, the Court held that "the dispositive 
issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a 
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the 
employer." Id. However, "there is no requirement that the 
challenged practice be `essential' or `indispensable' to the 
employer's business for it to pass muster." Id. 
 
Some members of Congress were displeased with the 
result in Wards Cove and argued for a stricter standard of 
business justification based on their reading of pre-Wards 
Cove cases. After two years of legislative struggle, Congress 
and the President agreed upon a compromise bill. Whether 
the ambiguous language of the statute accomplished that 
purpose has been the subject of lively debate.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition to the law review commentaries cited by the majority, see 
also Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 
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The 1990 bill, which had been vetoed by the President,2 
had used the phrase "required by business necessity," 
rather than "consistent with business necessity," as used in 
the 1991 Act. The substitution of the word "consistent" was 
considered to indicate a standard less stringent than would 
"required." In that light, a fair reading of the 1991 Act is 
"the challenged practice is job related for the position in 
question and in harmony with business necessity." 
 
It may fairly be said that the language ultimately adopted 
in the 1991 Act reflects an "agreement to disagree" and a 
return of the dispute to the courts for resolution. In short, 
unable to muster a veto-proof majority for either view, 
Congress "punted." This conclusion is underscored by 
Congress' highly unusual admonition that the courts 
consider only a designated "interpretive memorandum" as 
legislative history, rather than the more elaborate 
committee reports and other materials that customarily 
reveal the extent of the controversy between various views. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Civil Rights Act, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1011, 1033 (1993) ("Only . . . cases 
requiring proof of job-relatedness and a reasonable need for the 
challenged practice accord[ ] with both the statutory language of the 
1991 Act and the applicable Supreme Court precedent."); Kingsley R. 
Browne, The Civil Rights Act Of 1991: A "Quota Bill," A Codification Of 
Griggs, A Partial Return To Wards Cove, Or All Of The Above?, 43 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 287, 349 (1993) ("business necessity" has the same 
meaning as the Wards Cove phrase "serves, in a significant way"); Linda 
Lye, Comment, Title VII's Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of 
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense , 19 Berkeley J. 
Employment & Lab. L. 315, 358 (1998) (a challenged practice must be a 
"reasonable predictor of effective performance of job duties," defined in 
light of "important business goals"). 
 
2. The fear of quota hiring was behind the President's refusal to sign 
earlier versions of the bill. See Statement of President George Bush Upon 
Signing S. 1745, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768 (stating that the Act 
promotes the goals of ridding discrimination, allowing employers to hire 
on the "basis of merit and ability without the fear of unwarranted 
litigation," without leading to quotas or incentives for needless 
litigation). 
For a discussion of the drafting of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see 2 
Lex 
K. Larson, Employment Discrimination S 23.04[1] (2d ed. 1999). For 
analysis of the rejected 1990 bill, see Cynthia L. Alexander, The Defeat 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric In Search of 
Compromise, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 595 (1991). 
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See Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, S 105(b), 105 Stat. 1075. 
The interpretive memorandum states that: "The terms 
`business necessity' and `job related' are intended to reflect 
the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other 
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)." 137 Cong. Rec. S15276 
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991). 
 
Congress' reference to the Griggs line of Supreme Court 
decisions, however, does little to clear the air because the 
language in those opinions has caused confusion. 3 The 
problem can ultimately be traced back to Griggs itself. In 
that case, which involved power-plant jobs, the Court held 
that a high school completion requirement and general 
intelligence tests that disproportionately disqualified black 
applicants were not significantly job related. The Court 
said: "The touchstone is business necessity." Griggs, 401 
U.S. at 431. However, the very next sentence reads,"[i]f an 
employment practice . . . cannot be shown to be related to 
job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. Thus, the 
Court speaks of both "necessity" and "job-relatedness" in 
the same breath. 
 
In the following paragraph, we read that neither 
employment requirement is "shown to bear a demonstrable 
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which 
it was used. Both were adopted . . . without meaningful 
study of their relationship to job-performance ability." Id. 
The Court also refers to "testing mechanisms[that are] 
unrelated to measuring job capability," "job-related tests," 
and states that "any given requirement must have a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 
432-34, 436. Not once does the opinion repeat or expound 
upon "business necessity." Unquestionably,"job- 
relatedness" is Griggs' dominant thread. 
 
The Court also cited with approval former EEOC 
Guideline 29 C.F.R. S 1607.4(c), which required employers 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 769, 822 & n.213 
(1987) ("Both the Supreme Court and lower court rulings offer a 
confusing patchwork of seemingly conflicting standards."). 
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to produce data "demonstrating that the test is predictive of 
or significantly correlated with important elements of work 
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs 
for which candidates are being evaluated." Id . at 433 n.9. 
 
The Court next visited the concept of business 
justification in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 
(1975), where a paper mill was using screening tests that 
had a disparate impact on black applicants. The issue, 
according to the Court, was whether the employer had 
shown the tests to be "job related." Id . at 408. The Court 
concluded that the employer's validation study was 
defective because it "involved no analysis of the attributes 
of, or the particular skills needed in, the studied job 
groups." Id. at 432. The Court was also critical of hiring 
decisions based on the subjective opinions of supervisors. 
See id. at 432-33. 
 
The portion of Albemarle most relevant to the case at 
hand focused on whether tests that take into account 
capability for promotion may be utilized if such long-range 
requirements fulfill a "genuine business need." Id. at 434. 
The employer's validation study focused on the scores 
achieved by job groups near the top of the various lines of 
progression. The Court observed that those results did "not 
necessarily mean that the test, or some particular cutoff 
score on the test, is a permissible measure of the minimal 
qualifications of new workers entering lower level jobs." Id. 
at 434. Thus, the validation study was faulty because there 
had been "no clear showing that differential validation was 
not feasible for lower level jobs." Id. at 435. 
 
The Court next considered appropriate criteria in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which involved 
written tests that allegedly had a discriminatory impact on 
black applicants for police officer positions. Although the 
suit was not brought under Title VII, the Court discussed 
Griggs and Albemarle. The district judge had concluded 
"that a positive relationship between the test and training- 
course performance was sufficient to validate the[test], 
wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual 
performance as a police officer." Id. at 250. Significantly, 
the Supreme Court remarked that such a conclusion was 
not foreclosed by either Griggs or Albemarle and "it seems 
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to us the much more sensible construction of the job- 
relatedness requirement." Id. at 250-51. Dismissing 
challenges to the test, the Court remarked that"some 
minimum verbal and communicative skill would be very 
useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress in the 
training regimen." Id. at 250. 
 
In another case, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 
(1977), the Court held that height and weight requirements 
for prison guards could not stand. The ruling was based on 
the employer's failure to produce any evidence to correlate 
those standards with "the requisite amount of strength 
thought essential to good job performance." Id. at 331. In a 
footnote, Dothard repeated Griggs' statement that "[t]he 
touchstone is business necessity," and further stated that 
"a discriminatory employment practice must be shown to 
be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to 
survive a Title VII challenge." Id. at 332 n.14. Earlier in the 
body of the opinion, the Court explained that the employer 
must show that a requirement has " `a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.' " Id. at 329 
(quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). 
 
In yet another context, the Court upheld an employer's 
prohibition of employment to users of methadone, despite 
claims of disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics. See 
New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 
587 (1979). To the Court, the employer's narcotics rule, 
even in its application to methadone users, was"job 
related." Id. 
 
Beazer quoted the District Court's observation that 
"those goals [i.e., safety and efficiency] are significantly 
served by--even if they do not require--[the employer's] rule 
as it applies to all methadone users including those who 
are seeking employment in non-safety-sensitive positions." 
Id. at 587 n.31. The Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he 
record thus demonstrates that [the employer's] rule bears a 
`manifest relationship to the employment in question.' " Id. 
(quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). 
 
The Beazer Court observed that most of the affected job 
positions were "attended by unusual hazards and must be 
performed by `persons of maximum alertness and 
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competence.' " Id. at 571. Other positions were "critical" or 
"safety sensitive," and many involved "danger to [the 




As the preceding sketch of pre-Wards Cove opinions 
demonstrates, the Supreme Court's articulations of the 
appropriate standards are far from clear. Phrases such as 
"business necessity," "demonstrable relationship to 
successful performance of the job," "manifest relationship 
to the employment in question," "genuine business needs," 
and "essential to good job performance," have been used 
interchangeably. These varying formulations bring to mind 
Justice Holmes' observation, "A word is not a crystal, 
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living 
thought and may vary greatly in color and content 
according to the circumstances and the time in which it is 
used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
 
My study of the standard for business justification as set 
forth by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 convinces me that it 
remains essentially the same as it was in the pre-Wards 
Cove era. However, other than its holding on burden of 
proof, it does not seem that Wards Cove was a 
revolutionary pronouncement. Until the Supreme Court 
reexamines the subject, however, courts will continue to 
struggle with the often inconsistent phraseology employed 
in Griggs and its progeny. The definition and application of 
the appropriate standard for business justification will 
depend on the context in which it is raised. There are 
significant factual differences in the cases that explain, to 
some extent, the differing formulations. Albemarle and 
Griggs applied greater scrutiny when the disparate impact 
affected entry to lower-level jobs, where it is fair to assume 
that no special qualifications would be generally expected. 
 
In contrast, Beazer and Washington raised an additional 
important consideration -- public safety. Beazer concerned 
jobs involving serious dangers to employees as well as to 
transit passengers. In Washington, a written test 
demonstrating an applicant's ability to complete police 
officer training was job-related, even apart from its 
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relationship to actual performance as a police officer. The 
impact of public safety concerns on employee qualifications 
is inescapable, and serves to differentiate those positions 
from lower-level, nonsafety-sensitive ones.4 
 
The Courts of Appeals have explicitly recognized the 
relevance of safety considerations in a series of decisions 
beginning with Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 
216 (10th Cir. 1972). In that case, an airline required that 
applicants for flight officer positions have a college degree 
and a minimum of 500 flight hours. The Court, citing 
Griggs, held that where "the job clearly requires a high 
degree of skill and the economic and human risks involved 
in hiring an unqualified applicant are great, the employer 
bears a correspondingly lighter burden to show his 
employment criteria are job related." Id. at 219. Because, in 
the case of pilots, "[t]he risks involved in hiring an 
unqualified applicant are staggering . . . . [t]he courts . . . 
should proceed with great caution before requiring an 
employer to lower his pre-employment standards for such a 
job." Id. 
 
Another leading case, Davis v. City of Dallas , 777 F.2d 
205 (5th Cir. 1985), applied the Spurlock doctrine to criteria 
for hiring police officers. The City required a specific 
amount of college education, no history of recent marijuana 
usage, and a negative history of traffic violations. Despite 
findings of disparate impact, the Court upheld the 
requirements. Having reviewed the many cases following 
Spurlock, the Court had "no difficulty . . . equating the 
position of police officer in a major metropolitan area such 
as Dallas with other jobs that courts have found to involve 
the important public interest in safety." Id. at 215 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The degree of public risk and 
responsibility alone "would warrant examination of the job 
relatedness of the . . . education requirement under the 
lighter standard imposed under Spurlock and its progeny." 
Id. at 215. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to 
the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. 
L. Rev. 1479 (1996). 
 
                                36 
  
Observing the nature of the positions at issue in Griggs 
and Albemarle, Davis noted that in neither case did the 
Supreme Court suggest that those jobs "were noteworthy 
for their dangerousness or importance to the public 
welfare." Id. at 210. In contrast, the employment under 
consideration in Davis directly implicated public safety 
concerns. See id. at 211. It is interesting that Justice 
Blackmun, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 
977 (1988) (plurality op.), objecting to what he considered 
to be a tendency to weaken the employer's burden, cited 
Davis favorably, stating that "[t]he proper means of 
establishing business necessity will vary with the type and 
size of the business in question, as well as the particular 
job" in question. Id. at 1007. (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).5  
 
In a post-Wards Cove case involving firefighters, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that such 
"safety claims would afford the City an affirmative defense, 
for protecting employees from workplace hazards is a goal 
that, as a matter of law, has been found to qualify as an 
important business goal for Title VII purposes." Fitzpatrick 
v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing 
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 & n. 31; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 
n. 14). Thus, "[m]easures demonstrably necessary to 
meeting the goal of ensuring worker safety are therefore 
deemed to be `required by business necessity' under Title 
VII." Id. 
 
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit wrote that "the law does not require the city to put 
the lives of [plaintiff] and his fellow firefighters at risk by 
taking the chance that he is fit for duty when solid 
scientific studies indicate that persons with test results 
similar to his are not." Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 
1466, 1473 (8th Cir. 1996). Other Courts of Appeals have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In the analogous context of the defense of bona fide occupational 
qualification, the Supreme Court has stated: " `The greater the safety 
factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of 
that harm in case of an accident, the more stringent may be the job 
qualifications . . . .' " Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 
400, 
413 (1985) (quoting with approval Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 
F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
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reached similar conclusions in cases involving safety- 
sensitive positions such as truck drivers, bus drivers, 




The issues that separate the parties are straightforward. 
Plaintiffs do not seriously contest the fact that aerobic 
capacity is a valid predictor of efficient job performance as 
a transit police officer. They do not challenge the finding 
that running for 1.5 miles is an effective way to measure 
aerobic capacity. Nor apparently do they suggest that 42.5 
mL is an inappropriate cut-off for male applicants: they 
implicitly accept this standard by advancing Dr. McArdle's 
alternative test, which would use that score for males and 
a lower one for females. 
 
Even the government plaintiff concedes that an employer 
may improve its workforce. U.S. Br. at 35 (citing Griggs, 401 
U.S. at 431).7 Griggs, in turn, stressed that tests "must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See, e.g., York v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 95 F.3d 948, 
952, 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (powerhouse operating engineers); Zamlen v. 
City of Cleveland, 906 F.2d 209, 217 (6th Cir. 1990) (firefighters); Hamer 
v. City of Atlanta, 872 F.2d 1521, 1535 (11th Cir. 1989) (firefighters); 
Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(flight 
attendants); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 
1261-63 (6th Cir. 1981) (truck yard employees); Harriss v. Pan American 
World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980) (flight 
attendants); McCosh v. City of Grand Forks, 628 F.2d 1058, 1063 (8th 
Cir. 1980) (police); Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 54 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (airline pilots); see also Alito, supra, at 1033-35 & n.100. 
 
7. It is interesting that in the legislative history of the original text 
of Title 
VII, congressional advocates argued that "title VII would not require, and 
no court could read title VII as requiring, an employer to lower or change 
the occupational qualifications he sets for his employees . . . ." 110 
Cong. Rec. 7246-47 (April 8, 1964) (interpretive memorandum of Sen. 
Case). Senators Clark and Case stated that the "employer may set his 
qualifications as high as he likes . . . ." Id. at 7213 (April 8, 1964) 
(interpretive memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case). Senator Humphrey 
stated that "[t]he employer, not the Government, will establish the 
standards." Id. at 13088 (June 9, 1964). Thus, the legislative history of 
Title VII "clearly reveals that Congress was concerned about preserving 
employer freedom, and that it acted to mandate employer color-blindness 
with as little intrusion into the free enterprise system as possible." 
Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1278 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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measure the person for the job and not the person in the 
abstract." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. SEPTA's running test 
attempts to do just that, i.e., improve the caliber of its 
police force by selecting new hires to fit appropriately 
heightened performance standards. 
 
A fair appraisal of the plaintiffs' objection is that the 
running test's cut-off requires female applicants to run 
faster than a majority of women can run without training. 
However, nearly all of the women who did train were able 
to pass the test. Also, not all males were able to pass, 
although their failure percentages were substantially lower. 
 
Plaintiffs complain that SEPTA cannot point to any 
instances where a perpetrator of a crime got away, or an 
offense was committed because of an officer's lack of 
aerobic capacity. But as noted by Fitzpatrick, "[t]he mere 
absence of unfortunate incidents is not sufficient" to 
preclude a particular safety requirement because otherwise, 
such "measures could be instituted only once accidents 
had occurred rather than in order to avert accidents." 
Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1120-21. 
 
Here, where applicants have it within their power to 
prepare for the running test, they may properly be expected 
to do so. In view of the important public safety concerns at 
issue, it is not unreasonable to expect all applicants -- 
female or male -- to take the necessary steps in order to 
qualify for the positions. 
 
The District Court's conclusions must be appraised 
against this background. The trial was lengthy and the 
evidence extensive. The findings of fact on job needs with 
respect to aerobic capacity are not clearly erroneous. This 
conclusion is mandated by the standard that clear error 
exists only when, on the entire evidence, a court is left with 
the definite, firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564, 573 (1985). If the account of the District Court is 
"plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety," we 
may not reverse even if we are convinced that had we "been 
sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the 
evidence differently." Id. at 574. 
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Moreover, "[w]here there are two permissible views of the 
evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be 
clearly erroneous." Id. "This is so even when the district 
court's findings . . . are based instead on physical or 
documentary evidence or inferences from other facts." Id. 
Where findings are based on credibility determinations, 
appellate review accords even greater deference to the 
findings of the District Court. See id. at 575. Courts 
routinely hold that business justification is reviewed for 
clear error. See, e.g., Davis, 777 F.2d at 208 & n.1; 
Spurlock, 475 F.2d at 219-20. I accept, therefore, that 42.5 
mL is an appropriate level for the position of a SEPTA 
officer, that it is reasonable, and that it is attainable by 
otherwise physically fit female applicants with moderate 
training. 
 
The question then, is whether SEPTA's standard is 
permissible under the terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
and the relevant precedents. The District Court rejected the 
plaintiffs' contention that "business necessity" under the 
statute is governed by a footnote in Dothard that states: "[A] 
discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be 
necessary to safe and efficient job performance . . . ." 
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332 n.14. Rather, looking to Griggs 
and Beazer, the District Court stated that SEPTA need only 
show that its tests "significantly serve, but are neither 
required by nor necessary to, the employer's legitimate 
business interests" -- in other words, that it "bears a 
manifest relationship" to the employment in question. 
 
In disagreeing with the criteria used by the District 
Court, the majority holds that "a discriminatory cutoff score 
is impermissible unless shown to measure the minimum 
qualifications necessary for successful performance of the 
job in question." The difficulties presented by this standard 
are illustrated by the testimony of Dr. McArdle, the 
plaintiffs' expert. In essence, he proposed that female 
applicants be expected to meet 50% of their aerobic 
capacity, translating to 36 mL, but that males continue at 
the 50% level of 42.5 mL. That standard would, of course, 
have less adverse impact on women, but according to the 
findings of the District Court, would also have a 
detrimental impact on the effectiveness of the SEPTA 
transit police. 
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With this in mind, I cannot agree that the majority's 
standard is the correct one for this case. Reducing 
standards towards the lowest common denominator is 
particularly inappropriate for a police force. Undoubtedly, 
candidates who fail the running test -- female or male -- 
may have other qualities of particular value to SEPTA, but 
they must possess the requisite aerobic capacity as well. No 
matter how laudable it is to reduce job discrimination, to 
achieve this goal by lowering important public safety 
standards presents an unacceptable risk. 
 
Aerobic capacity is an objective, measurable factor which 
gauges the ability of a human being to perform physical 
activity. The aerobic demands on the human system are 
affected by absolutes such as the distance traveled, the 
speed, the number of steps to be climbed, and similar 
factors. Governmental agency pronouncements will not 
shorten distances, reduce the number of steps, or decrease 
the aerobic capacity of perpetrators to match the reduced 
standards of officers, male or female.8  Some males and 
more females cannot meet the necessary requirements. 
Based on the facts established at trial, those individuals 
simply cannot perform the job efficiently. To the extent that 
they cannot, their hire adversely affects public safety. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although the government is a plaintiff in this dispute, I would note 
that some agencies take a somewhat different tack on the issue of 
aerobic fitness. The U.S. Forest Service, for instance, requires 
firefighters 
to have an aerobic capacity of 45 to 48 mL, and recommends one of up 
to 50. See United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 
Technology & Development Program, Fitness and Work Capacity 51 (2d 
ed. 1997). Notably, that agency currently uses a 1.5 mile run test. See 
id. at 50-51. 
 
Also, the Presidential Physical Fitness Award is available to children 
who meet the 85th percentile of fitness by meeting target levels in events 
such as a one-mile run. See Qualifying Standards (updated Oct. 15, 
1998). http://www.indiana.edu/#A1#preschal/qualifying.html>. 
 
The Centers For Disease Control and Prevention lament that more 
than 60% of U.S. adults do not engage in the recommended amount of 
activity, and 25% are not active at all. See Physical Activity and Health, 
Adults (viewed May 7, 1999) http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/sgr/ 
adults.htm>. 
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The current Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. S 1607 ("EEOC Guidelines"), are not 
as strict as the standard suggested by the majority. In 
discussing cut-off scores, the Guidelines explicitly state 
that "they should normally be set so as to be reasonable 
and consistent with normal expectations of acceptable 
proficiency within the work force." 29 C.F.R.S 1607.5(H) 
(1998). Further, the EEOC Guidelines standard -- 
"predictive of or significantly correlated with important 
elements" -- has been cited by the Supreme Court with 
approval on several occasions. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 
431 (quoting former 29 C.F.R. S 1607.4(c)); Griggs, 401 U.S. 
at 433 n.9 (quoting same); see also 29 C.F.R. S 1607.5(B) 
(1998). 
 
Further, Albemarle's reference to "minimal qualifications" 
was directed only to the inappropriateness of using a test 
geared towards higher-level jobs as a screen for entry-level 
positions. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 434. This holding, 
which is minimally relevant to the matter at hand, is 
doubly inapplicable when the job affects public safety. See 
Davis, 777 F.2d at 211 n.5.9 
 
I see no need to remand this case to the District Court. 
Whatever standard is used, the findings of fact require an 
affirmance. Although the District Court rejected the 
plaintiffs' argument that the Dothard footnote, rather than 
Beazer, supplied the proper standard, the factual findings 
make it clear that under either formulation, the District 
Court reached the correct result. 
 
The Dothard footnote states that the challenged practice 
must be "necessary to safe and efficient job performance." 
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331 n.14. The District Court, also in 
a footnote, wrote "physical fitness is only one trait or ability 
required of SEPTA officers, [but] it is a trait or ability that 
is necessary for and critical to the successful performance 
of the job, and thus SEPTA should be able to test for such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The plaintiffs also suggest that SEPTA's validation studies were 
insufficient. However, strict compliance with the EEOC Guidelines is not 
necessary in all cases. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587 n.31; Washington, 
426 U.S. at 250-51. In cases involving public safety, courts have held 
that empirical validation is not required. See Boyd, 568 F.2d at 54. 
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a trait." This finding more than complies with Dothard's 
footnote by concluding that not only is physical fitness 
"necessary" to safe and efficient job performance as SEPTA 
officers, but that it is "critical" to successful performance of 
these jobs. Moreover, the finding clearly meets even the 
criterion that cut-off scores "measure the minimum 
qualifications necessary for successful performance of the 
job." (emphasis added). 
 
Nor can there be any doubt that the factual findings here 
satisfy Griggs' requirement of "business necessity." 
Unquestionably, SEPTA's test is job-related and there can 
be no doubt that physical fitness, and particularly aerobic 
capacity, is necessary for adequate performance of the job 
of a SEPTA transit officer. The findings are convincing that 
42.5 mL is a reasonable cut-off point for determining the 
physical ability necessary for successful performance of the 
job. Consequently, even under the plaintiffs' reading of the 
1991 Act, which relies so much on Dothard, the judgment 
in favor of the defendant should be affirmed. 
 
To my mind, the correct standard for this case is that of 
Spurlock-Davis, one that places greater emphasis on the 
safety of the public and fellow officers. I have no doubt that 
this line of cases survives the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
because those opinions -- as noted in Congress' 
"interpretive memorandum" -- "reflect the concepts 
enunciated" in Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards 
Cove. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 
587 n.31; Washington, 426 U.S. at 250; Smith, 99 F.3d at 
1473; Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1119. Safety concerns are 
clearly "concepts" considered by the Supreme Court and 
applied in various factual circumstances by the Courts of 
Appeals, both in pre- and post-Wards Cove cases. Nothing 
in the legislative history casts any doubt on the continued 
viability of these opinions. 
 
Although it did not cite Spurlock-Davis, the District Court 
stated in its conclusions of law that "employers such as 
SEPTA should be encouraged to improve the efficiency of its 
workforce, especially where public safety is implicated by 
the particular job as it is with SEPTA." More emphatically, 
it stated that "[t]he Court simply will not condone dilution 
of readily obtainable physical abilities standards that serve 
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to protect the public safety in order to allow unfit 
candidates, whether they are male or female, to become 
SEPTA transit police officers." 
 
Although the District Court only inferentially applied 
Spurlock-Davis, I would do so explicitly and affirm the 
judgment on that basis.10 Here, the record supplies ample 
evidence about safety concerns related to the performance 
of SEPTA officers. In cases such as these, courts should 
decline to lower standards in an effort to reduce disparate 
impact when that goal comes at the expense of public 
safety. Due deference should be afforded to the experience 
of specialized employers in setting appropriate requirements 




The Lanning appellants propose a number of alternative 
practices that they suggest would have a lesser disparate 
impact while still serving SEPTA's goals. First, they suggest 
that SEPTA select medically fit applicants who pass fitness 
requirements at the end of their training at the Philadelphia 
Police Academy. Second, as noted earlier, they argue in 
favor of a relative fitness test (i.e., one with a lower cut-off 
point for females). Third, they prompt SEPTA to propose an 
alternative. 
 
For plaintiffs to establish a satisfactory alternative, they 
must "make[ ] the demonstration described in [42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-2(k)(1)(C)] with respect to an alternative 
employment practice and [establish that] the[employer] 
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice." 42 
U.S.C. S 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). To meet this burden, the 
plaintiffs' proposed alternatives must have less disparate 
impact and "also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 
`efficient and trustworthy workmanship.' " Albemarle, 422 
U.S. at 425; see also NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 
1322, 1336 n.17 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). As stated in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. An order of the District Court may be affirmed on alternative grounds 
where the judgment is supported by the record below. See Guthrie v. 
Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(citing Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)). 
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Watson, the alternative test must "be equally as effective as 
the challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate 
business goals." Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. 
 
The District Court found that none of the plaintiffs' 
proposals served SEPTA's legitimate interest in having a 
more physically fit work force. If SEPTA may require an 
aerobic capacity of 42.5 mL after training at the police 
academy, as plaintiffs propose, it is unclear how that 
practice would be any less discriminatory than requiring it 
before hire. In short, that plan would simply require that 
training be on "company time" rather than on that of the 
applicants. 
 
As to the relative fitness test proposed by the plaintiffs' 
expert, the factual findings demonstrate that officers with a 
capacity of 36 mL do not serve SEPTA's needs as well as 
the required standard of 42.5 mL.11 Finally, the proposal 
that SEPTA come forward with an alternative is not an 
alternative at all. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to meet their 
burden to establish an alternative employment practice. 
 
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 presents another potential barrier to the 
relative fitness test. Subsection 2000e-2(l) prohibits "in connection with 
the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment . . . 
to . . . use different cutoff scores for . . . employment related tests on 
the 
basis of . . . sex[.]" By its plain language, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(l) 
arguably 
prohibits a relative fitness test. The District Court concluded that this 
provision did not apply. I have some doubt on that ruling, but need not 
reach that issue because I would affirm on other bases. 
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